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Abstract 
This study aims at investigating the extent of interaction between monetary policy and macro-
prudential policy in Jordan during the period (2005-2015) using the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) to check the presence of short-term and long-term impacts of the monetary policy 
tools in general on the accumulation of systemic risks in the banking system. Systemic risk was 
measured using the credit gap. The results showed the existence of a statistically significant 
negative effect of deposit window rate and required reserve ratio on the accumulation of systemic 
risks, whereas the rediscount rate had a positive effect. 
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1. Introduction 
The last global financial crisis revealed the need for linking financial risks with economic risks through the so-
called macro-prudential policy1. This policy aims at maintaining financial stability as an ultimate goal through 
identifying, monitoring and quantifying the systemic risks in the financial system as a whole (Claessens et al., 
2013). Several studies, like Claessens et al. (2013) stressed the necessity of coordinating monetary and macro-
prudential policies so that their objectives do not conflict. The interest of monetary authorities in the world in 
maintaining financial stability significantly increased after the conclusion of the global financial crisis through the 
newly emerged macro-prudential policy that was included to the duties of the monetary authorities in many world 
countries. The regulatory monetary authorities paid extra attention to the risks of the excessive credit expansion as 
it might lead to the accumulation of systemic risks.  For example, the growth of household debt at higher rates 
than their income or net wealth might signal increases in credit risk for this sector, which in turn might adversely 
affect financial and economic stability. This entails on the banking sector to monitor the risks associated with the 
lending offered to the household sector. The expansion of credit to this sector must take into consideration these 
risks. The monetary authorities were made aware to the importance of continually monitoring and assessing 
systemic risks after the global financial crisis through the implementation of macro-prudential policy tools that 
alleviate the risks that the financial sector as a whole might be subjected to, and that enhance its capacity to 
withstand shocks. 
 
2. Research Problem 
This study inspects the extent of the interaction between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy in 
Jordan by examining the effect of the adjustments in monetary policy instruments on the accumulation of systemic 
risks in the banking system in Jordan through realizing that adjusting monetary policy instruments do not lead to 
an Increase in the credit gap,2 and, hence the accumulation of systemic risks in the banking system during the 
study period.  
 
3. Research Questions 
The study tries to answer the following two questions: 
1. Has the use of monetary policy instruments led to the accumulation of systemic risk in the banking system 
during the study period? 
2. Do adjustments in monetary policy instruments lead to widening the credit gap in Jordan? 
 
4. Importance of the Research 
The importance of investigating the interaction of monetary policy with macro-prudential policy is due to the 
high interconnection between the two policies. If the monetary authority cut the interest rates on monetary policy 
instruments, the banks might react by cutting the interest rates imposed on credit facilities. This might 
consequently reduce the net interest margin in the banking system. In turn, this encourages the households to 
demand more borrowing and hence their indebtedness goes up excessively leading to accumulation of systemic 
risks possibly. The cut of the monetary policy interest rates might lead to increase in the value of assets fueled by 
the increasing demand on real estate loans that are offered at relatively lower costs (interest rates). The 
exaggerated real estate prices might create a financial crisis in case these prices decrease sharply by forces like 
economic downturns (Beyer et al., 2017). 
 
5. Research Objectives 
This paper aims at conforming to the regulatory authorities represented by the central banks the importance of 
coordination between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy changes in the monetary policy instruments 
interest rates might cause accumulation of systemic risks arising from excessive credit growth that is 
disproportionate to the growth in the real economy (GDP growth). This consequently might adversely affect the 
stability of both the financial system and the economic system. 
 
6. Research Hypothesis 
The paper examines the following hypothesis: 
There is no effect of monetary policy instruments on the accumulation of systemic risks (the widening of credit 
gap) at 10.0% level of significance.  
 
7. Literature Review 
There are several studies in the literature that researched the interaction between monetary policy and macro-
prudential policy. In general, the path of the investigation was through examining the effect of monetary policy on 
the accumulation of systemic risks. For example, Goodhart et al. (2009) and Illing (2006) found that the tight 
monetary policy might lead to an increase in default rates of borrowers from the banks, a decrease in bank's 
profitability rates and an increase in non-performing loans that collectively might cause an accumulation of 
systemic risk that might eventually cause a financial crisis (Goodhart et al., 2009); (Illing, 2006). 
Dell'Ariccia et al. (2010); Borio and Zhu (2012) and Valencia (2014) inserted that the expansionary monetary 
policies might motivate banks to increase their risk appetite. In turn, they are encouraged to extend more credit at 
                                                             
1. The macro-prudential policy is defined as the policy under which systemic risk is identified, monitored and controlled to mitigate the accumulation of these 
risks and enhance the ability of the financial system to withstand shocks using a set of tools based on key indicators (Central Bank of Jordan, 2012).  
2The quarterly credit gap is calculated by dividing the amount of loans at the end of a given quarter by the annualized GDP – the value of GDP in the relevant 
quarter plus the GDP in the previous three quarters. The difference between this value (called actual credit to GDP ratio) and its long-term trend (extracted 
using The Hodrick-Prescott filter) is the credit gap  
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low interest rates. This might also be accompanied by insuficient assessment of their cleints' solvency before 
extending the credit. As a result, the systemic risk increases (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2010); (Borio and Zhu, 2012); 
(Valencia, 2014). 
Claessens et al. (2013) indicated that cutting interest rates on monetary policy instruments will make the banks 
cut their interest rates on the credit extended to their clients. Consequently, the total size of credit facilities 
increases, leading to increase in asset prices and, hence, the accumulation of systemic risks (Claessens et al., 2013). 
As for the credit gap determinants, the studies are small in this regard. This is mostly attributed to the fact 
that the credit gap concept came to attention after the recent global financial crisis. In this regard, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued a guide in 2010 that includes an algorithm for calculating credit 
gap (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). 
Gersl and Seidler (2012) surveyed the determinants of credit gap (as conceptualized by BCBS). They found that 
household consumption and per capita GDP both had a statistically significant positive effect on credit gap in the 
long run at 1.0% level of significance as the credit gap in the long-term rises with the rise in household's wealth 
and the increase in their consumption  (Gersl and Seidler, 2012). Similarly, the household consumption in the short 
run had a statistically significant positive effect on the credit gap at 5.0% level of significance. In contrast, inflation 
had a statistically significant negative effect on the gap at 10.0% level of significance. In light of the results of the 
econometric analysis, the study concluded that inflation and interest rates on monetary policy instruments are 
negatively related with credit gap. The decline in both the interest rates on monetary policy instruments and 
inflation rates result in lower interest rates on bank lending and, hence, higher demand for credit by households, 
leading eventually to widening in the credit gap (Gersl and Seidler, 2012). 
 
8. Theoretical and Empirical Contribution of the Paper 
It is inevitable the importance of coordinating macro-prudential policy and monetary policy, especially since 
both policies, as it is mostly the case, are formulated by the monetary authority. The Central Bank of Jordan is an 
example, the paper targets to enhance the capacity of CBJ in evaluating the effect of monetary policy on credit gap 
in Jordan, besides stressing the vital role of macro-prudential policy in curbing the buildup of systemic risk and the 
importance of policy coordination in general. And in particular, when credit grows excessively and 
disproportionately with the growth in the real economy leading to the accumulation of systemic risks and might 
create imbalances in the financial system and the economy as a whole. 
 
9. Macro-prudential Policy  
There is a high degree of uncertainty when it comes to the concept of macro-prudential policy and its role in 
maintaining financial and monetary stability. This uncertainty includes its objectives, tools and management and 
implementation. There are varied opinions when it comes to the role of macro-prudential policy. For example, does 
the policy aim at protecting the banking and financial systems from the fluctuations in the economic cycle? If so, 
then the policy objective is maintaining financial stability. Alternatively, does the macro-prudential policy aim at 
protecting the economy from the fluctuations in the financial cycle? If this is the case, then the macro-prudential 
policy is more oriented towards the macro-economy (Akerlof et al., 2014). Moreover, despite the presence of new 
supervisory authorities that are responsible for formulating and implementing the macro-prudential policy in both 
advanced and emerging economies, there are some ambiguities regarding the role of the policy, how to implement 
it and when it can be more effective (Aikman et al., 2013). 
Prior to the global financial crisis, there were no linkages (i.e. coordination) between the major economic 
policies (monetary and fiscal policies) and the micro-prudential policy (financial supervision). Put differently, 
economic risks and financial risks were independent. Economic policymaking does not take into consideration the 
financial risks that might emerge through the implementation of the policies, aiming solely at achieving price 
stability and maintaining sustainable economic growth. Similarly, the micro-prudential policy (financial 
supervision) does not count for economic risks, targeting to achieve its own objective of maintaining the soundness 
of financial institutions on individual level only, but not collectively, therefore, the risk that the financial system as 
a whole might be vulnerable to and affected adversely by, the systemic risk, was not taken into consideration 
(Figure 1).  
One of the lessons from the global financial crisis is that maintaining financial stability on the individual level 
of the institutions in the financial system is insufficient to maintain the stability of the financial system as the 
whole.  
 
 
Figure-1. Policies and Objectives before the Global Financial Crisis 
                                      Source: International Monetary Fund. 
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During the crisis, the financial positions of many financial institutions in the United States of America were 
relatively stable, but the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Bank was followed by the collapse of other banks affected 
by the contagion risk. The crisis exacerbated further spread cross border from USA to hit the world so that the 
entire global financial system has been put to the test, which has adversely impacted the economies of countries 
outputting heavy losses for many years. In sum, the stability of both financial and economic systems can only be 
achieved if financial and economic risks are both taken into consideration when making economic and macro-
prudential policies decision. 
As a result of the global financial crisis, the supervisory authorities became aware of the vital importance of 
coordinating economic policies and micro prudential policies through the so-called macro-prudential policy that 
targets achieving and maintaining financial stability on the entire financial system’s level. This macro-prudential 
policy interlinks economic and financial risks to achieve its main objective (Figure 2) through identifying, 
monitoring and controlling systemic risks using several tools that consider matching the developments in the 
financial system with the developments in the real economy. The macro-prudential policy curbs the ability of the 
financial system in extending credit through the activation of the appropriate macro-prudential instrument that is 
compatible with the stance of the economy. For example, during boost, the real estate prices might follow a fast 
and positive trend (put simply, real estate bubble) and can be therefore used as collaterals for loans, leading to 
increased demand for credit by individuals and households. During recessions, however, the situation is reversed, 
the real estate prices decrease sharply, leading to a decline in the value of the credit extended. The economic 
situation worsens even more as a result of the decline in the value of real estate asset as collateral for the credit 
extended and decline in the ability of households to repay their obligations. Consequently, the bank sells the 
mortgages at lower prices than the value of the credit extended (as was with the global financial crisis). 
The macro-prudential policy mainly targets to control and supervise the ability of banks in extending excessive 
credit using the suitable instrument – during boost periods. Thereby helps protect financial stability and economy 
from severe losses.  
 
 
Figure-2. Policies and Objectives after the Global Financial Crisis 
                                 Source: International Monetary Fund. 
 
The comparison of policies and objectives before and after the global financial crisis as shown in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 respectively clearly shows the important role of Macro-prudential policy. Before the emergence of this 
policy, the micro-prudential policy was the actor in achieving its major goal of maintaining financial stability on the 
individual institutional level regardless of the economic policies in general and monetary policy in particular. 
Similarly, the monetary policy directed toward achieving price stability and promoting economic activity 
regardless of the performance or stance of the micro-prudential policy.  
In the wake of the global financial crisis, decision makers in the regulatory authorities have alerted to the 
importance of balancing economic policies and micro-prudential policies so that these policies are linked. Thus, the 
macro-prudential policy was developed to act as a link between micro-prudential policy and the economic policies. 
The objective of the macro-prudential policy is to achieve financial stability as an ultimate policy objective by using 
of some tools that take account of the prevailing conditions in both the financial and economic systems. In addition, 
the macro-prudential policy promotes the ability of financial and banking sectors to withstand economic and 
financial shocks that they may face at any time. Under any circumstances, the macro-prudential policy needs 
support from the other economic policies in order to achieve its objectives. In this regard, the monetary policy must 
be conducted effectively (Borio, 2012). 
 
10. Systemic Risk  
One of the most important lessons that are learned from the global financial crisis that financial stability at the 
micro level of the banking system is insufficient to achieve financial stability at the macro level because of the so-
called systemic risks that hit the whole financial system. The 2012 Financial Stability Report published by the CBJ 
defined systemic risks as the risks that affect the entire financial system (CBJ, 2012). Examples of systemic risks 
are: 
Excessive credit growth that does not match the size of economic activity, in such a case, the credit is directed 
towards the nonproductive consumption sectors. For example, the banks' expansion of credit to the household 
sector might result in a slowdown in economic growth as a result of the increase in imports that negatively affects 
trade balance. 
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1. High exposure to assets (stocks and real estate) that witness a large increase, which might consequently 
lead to price bubbles. 
2. High exposure of banks to the mostly nonproductive household sector at the expense of the productive 
corporate sector. 
Bernanke defined systemic risk as "developments that threaten the stability of the financial system as a whole 
and consequently the broader economy, not just that of one or two institutions” (CBJ, 2012). 
Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board agreed 
on defining on defining systemic risk as “the risk of widespread disruption to the provision of financial services that 
is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system, and which can cause serious negative 
consequences for the real economy” (FSB/IMF/BIS, 2009). In other words, systemic risks are costs or financial 
losses caused by that disruption reflected in either the financial sector or the real economy or both in case of 
occurrence of financial crisis. Relying on the previous discussion, it can be concluded that systemic risk arises by 
the interaction of three forces: a financial shock, an interruption in the provision of financial services and the 
materialization of economic losses. 
 
11. Financial Stability 
Economists have put several definitions for financial stability. However, these definitions are similar in context 
despite different wordings. For example, Laker (1999) indicated that in light of the fact that achieving financial 
stability is itself an objective, then “the objective of financial system stability could therefore be defined, in broad 
terms, as the avoidance of disruptions to the financial system that are likely to cause significant costs to real 
output” (Laker, 1999); (Alawode and Al Sadek, 2008). According to Schinasi (2004) “financial stability is defined in 
terms of its ability to facilitate and enhance economic processes, manage risks, and absorb shocks. Moreover, 
financial stability is considered a continuum: changeable over time …” (Schinasi, 2004). He also pointed out that 
the financial system will stable if it promotes the performance of the economy and overcomes the financial 
imbalances arising from unexpected adverse events. In other words, financial stability is the case where the 
economic mechanisms of pricing and financial risk management (credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, operating 
risk. etc.) are working in such a way as to contribute to the performance of the economy. 
In line with the previous discussion, it can be clearly concluded that the definition of financial stability is linked 
to the components and activities of the financial system. Besides, the role of the monetary authority in achieving or 
maintaining financial stability is vital due to the fact that the monetary authority is usually the leader supervisory 
party on the banking and financial institutions. 
Financial Stability was defined by the CBJ in its JFSR 2012 as the situation under which the financial system 
(that includes financial intermediaries like banks, markets stocks; derivatives and bonds, and market infrastructure 
like payment systems) is capable of withstanding shocks and adjusting imbalances without interrupting the 
financial intermediation process through facilitating the smooth flow of funds between savers and investors and, by 
doing so, help promote growth in economic activity (CBJ, 2012). 
 
12. Macro-Prudential Policy Instruments 
The macro-prudential supervision is defined as the supervision of financial institutions and their transactions 
on a macro level. Therefore, the micro supervision on individual institutions is not part of the macro-prudential 
supervision mandate. The macro-prudential policy is defined as the policy under which systemic risk is identified, 
monitored and controlled to mitigate the accumulation of these risks and enhance the ability of the financial system 
to withstand shocks using a set of tools based on key indicators. The macro-prudential policy gained a special focus 
after the 2008 global financial crisis.  
Based on the classification set by the Committee on the Global Financial System with the BIS, the macro-
prudential policy instruments are classified into three main categories, capital-based instruments, liquidity-based 
instruments and asset-side instruments.   
Capital-based instruments include countercyclical capital buffers, sectorial capital requirements, and dynamic 
provisions; whereas liquidity-based instruments encompass net stable funding ratio and liquidity coverage ratio. 
Asset-side instruments are loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratio.  
There is another classification of the macro-prudential policy instruments set by the IMF. It divided the 
instruments into two main groups. One group is designed to mitigate systemic risk like the asset-side based tools. 
The other group of tools is designed to enhance the resilience of the financial system to withstand shocks like 
capital-based and liquidity-based tools.  
There are two determinants of the activation of deactivation of the macro-prudential policy instruments: 
1. The appropriate timing for activating or deactivating the macro-prudential policy instruments.  
2. The appropriate macro-prudential policy instrument(s).  
The financial cycle is considered a very important factor in determining the appropriate timing for 
operationalizing the macro-prudential policy instruments.3 At the boom stage of the financial cycle, the macro-
prudential policy instruments must be activated to curb the appetite of banks in offering credit to protect the 
economic and financial system from bearing severe losses in case dangers materialize. At the bust stage, the 
monetary policy instruments must be released to motivate the banks to provide credit to motivate the economy.  
 
13. Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
The proportionality of the growth of the credit granted to the private sector with the size of economic activity 
is one of the driving forces that ensure that credit is directed towards the productive economic sectors. This 
proportionality is abbreviated by the ratio of private credit to GDP. The importance of this ratio is that it measures 
                                                             
3Financial cycle characterizes the behaviour of the credit-to-GDP ratio, quantity of credit, assets prices (real estate and stocks). Akerlof, Blanchard, Romer and 
Stigliz (2014). 
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systemic risks from a financial and economic perspective by examining the degree of harmony of two important 
macro indicators: (1) the credit granted to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions and (2) GDP. 
The BCBS released a guide to the relevant supervisory authorities entitled “Guidance for National Authorities 
Operating the Countercyclical Capital Buffer” (BCBS, 2010). The guidance details an algorithm for determining the 
amount of the countercyclical capital buffer that banks and financial institutions needed to maintain the 
proportionality of financial and real sectors trends.  
1. Collecting historical quarterly data of credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial 
institutions and GDP. 
2. Calculating the credit-to-GDP ratio in period t. 
3. Estimating the trend of the ratio of private credit-to-GDP in period t using econometric software.4 
4. Calculating the credit-to-GDP gap. The credit-to-GDP ratio is compared to its long-term trend. If the 
credit-to-GDP ratio is significantly above its trend (i.e., there is a large positive gap), then this is an 
indication that credit may have grown excessively relative to GDP growth. In mathematical terminology, 
Gap = (credit/GDP*100%)-Trend. If this gap is greater than 10.0%, then the authorized entity mandates 
the banks to add a buffer to its capital equal to 2.5% of Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). Moreover, if this gap 
is less than 2.0%, then the authorized entity does not mandate banks to make any additions. Finally, If this 
gap ranges between these two limits (2.0%-10.0%), then the authorized entity mandates the banks to add a 
buffer to its capital equal that ranges between 0.0% and 2.5% of Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) based on the 
formula:             ⁄  (        ). 
 
14. Monetary Policy and Macro-prudential Policy Interaction 
The coordination of macro-prudential and monetary policies is elements that must be considered when 
formulating a framework for macro-prudential policy since both policies aimed at achieving financial stability and 
affecting real economic variables.   
Both macro-prudential policy and monetary policy to influence the price and quantity of credit in the economy, 
which in turn is likely to affect overall economic activity, the contradiction could take place with the 
implementation of these two policies.  For example, using one or more monetary policy instruments targeting to 
cut down interest rates leads to an increase in the amount of credit in the economy. At the same time, the macro-
prudential policy while keeps an eye on credit growth might use some instruments to curb the growth of credit 
above desired limits (long-term trends) through the activation of one more macro-prudential policy instruments. 
Similarly, real economic activity and interest rates influence systemic risk via their impact on the size of credit that 
is considered one of the most important factors that lead to the accumulation of systemic risk in the financial sector.  
Moreover, both monetary and macro-prudential policymakers build their decisions in practice using similar 
data, pointing to potential interactions. For example, financial conditions such as lending conditions and credit size 
are important information sources for monetary policy and would of course constitute core inputs to macro-
prudential policymaking. On the other hand, the macro-prudential policymaker would also take the state of the 
business cycle and the stance of monetary policy into account in deciding the appropriate macro-prudential 
instruments. 
The paper of Claessens et al. (2013) about “Interaction of Monetary and Macro-prudential Policies" stressed the 
importance of monetary and macro-prudential policies' coordination even though the task cannot be easily 
performed. The policy coordination will most likely have positive effects on enhancing financial stability since 
monetary policy helps in maintaining the balance in the economy, and the macro-prudential policy aims at 
addressing the imbalances in the financial system. The absence of coordination between the two policies might a 
failure of each of them in achieving its objective. 
The previous reveals the importance of both policies being managed by the monetary authorities. The 
existence of a single institutional framework reduces the possibility of conflicting independent policy decisions. 
Price stability - the ultimate goal of monetary policy - does not guarantee economic stability in the absence of 
effective treatment of macro-financial risks that are within the tasks of macro-prudential policy.  
Empirical evidence has shown that the instability in the financial system undermines the stability of the 
economy even if the inflation rate is maintained stable and low. The macro-prudential policy instruments are 
complementary to monetary policy instruments in countering the cyclical fluctuations of the economy. In this 
regard, some instruments of the macro-prudential policy (e.g., capital adequacy and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio) that 
do not only achieve the macro-prudential policy objectives, but also the objectives of monetary policy (Federico et 
al., 2014); (Tovar et al., 2012). Therefore, policymakers paid more attention to the relationship between the two 
policies. As previously stated, monetary policy is primarily aimed at maintaining price stability; while the macro-
prudential policy is primarily aimed at maintaining financial stability. 
The relationship between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy is counterbalanced by the "side effects" 
resulting from each one of another. These interactions could enhance or downgrade the effectiveness of each policy 
in achieving its objectives (Gerlach et al., 2009). For example, monetary policy instruments might encourage banks 
to expand credit in a period when the macro-prudential policy is aimed at controlling the leverage ratio. The 
activation of one of the macro-prudential policy instruments to reduce credit granted by banks to the private sector 
might lead to a contradiction in case of adopting an expansionary monetary policy aiming at promoting economic 
growth.  
In the existence of coordination between the two policies, they are supportive of each other. For example, the 
absence of reaction of economic variables to a deflationary monetary policy can be resolved by imposing a ceiling 
on the LTV ratio instrument of macro-prudential policy and thus controlling the banks' capacity to grant excessive 
credit (Igan and Kang, 2011). Similarly, the absence of reaction of economic variables to an expansionary monetary 
policy can be resolved by cutting down on the limit of LTV ratio as an instrument of macro-prudential policy and 
thus enhancing the banks' capacity to grant more credit. Any increase in banking risk arising from the 
                                                             
4 One of the most commonly used software in this kind of research is E-Views that can be used to estimate trend using The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 
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expansionary monetary policy and the reduction of the LTV ratio can be controlled by raising capital requirements, 
liquidity or leverage. 
 
15. Monetary Policy of the CBJ 
The CBJ continued to implement monetary policy to achieve monetary and financial stability in the Kingdom, 
by continuing to follow economic conditions and various relevant variables and then using all the tools available at 
the appropriate time for achieving those goals. These tools are divided into main interest rates and open market 
operations. Within the context of the CBJ’s strategy of continuous development of its monetary policy tools to 
achieve its objectives in line with the economic and monetary conditions, it has established an operational 
framework of monetary policy and its tools to determine their effectiveness in achieving the objectives of monetary 
policy. Because of the aforementioned revision, since 2012, the CBJ continuously review and update the monetary 
policy operational framework and its tools. The most recent update granted the commercial banks and the CBJ 
more flexibility in managing liquidity in line with financial and monetary conditions under the high volume of 
financing needs for Jordan.  
 
15.1. Updating the Monetary Policy Operational Framework  
15.1.1. Temporary Open Market Operations  
These operations are designed to enhance open-market operations to influence the size of the excess reserves 
and adjusting overnight interbank rates within the Corridor System and targeting market interest rates at the 
desired level of monetary policy, by introducing the securities repurchase agreements for a week to a month 
through auctions conducted by the CBJ. 
 
15.1.2. Outright Open Market Operations 
This tool provided the CBJ of the ability to access the money market as a seller and buyer of Government 
securities and guaranteed pump or withdrawal liquidity in accordance with the requirements of economic activity, 
and to enhance the role of the secondary market dealing in bonds. 
 
15.1.3. Currency Swap 
According to this tool, the CBJ made several foreign currency swaps in Jordanian dinars in response to 
requests by licensed banks to strengthen the dinar liquidity of banks. 
 
15.1.4. Corridor System 
Where this system is used in the implementation of monetary policy, it aims at adjusting to influence the 
overnight interbank interest rate, which in turn affects interest rates in the market. The overnight deposit interest 
rate represents the floor of the system while the repurchase agreement interest rate represents the ceiling of the 
system. The REPOs are initiated by banks in case they needed liquidity with no limits for one night only. The 
interest rate on the overnight REPOs is the upper limit in the corridor system. Whereas the overnight deposit 
window transactions are initiated by banks as well but their interest rates are the lower limit of the corridor 
system. Figure 3 shows the trends of the overnight deposit window rate, the overnight REPOs rate (and the 
corresponding corridor system) and the overnight interbank loan rate, as might be realized from the figure that the 
overnight interbank interest rate moving between the overnight deposit interest rate and the REPOs rate.  
 
 
Figure-3. Overnight Interbank interest rate, Overnight Deposit Window interest rate and REPOs interest rate 
(2005-2015) 
                        Source: Statistical database, CBJ. 
 
15.1.5. CBJ Main Rate 
At the beginning of 2015, CBJ adopted this price as a main interest rate for managing the monetary policy. The 
CBJ main rate was decided to range between 2.5% and 2.75% (expressed in terms of REPOs for one week). This 
action aims to give clear signals about the stance of monetary policy and orientation about the domestic and 
international economic monetary and economic conditions. 
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15.1.6. Certificates of Deposit (CDs) 
To develop liquidity management tools to enhance the ability of banks to manage their liquidity efficiently and 
effectively, the CBJ issued certificates of deposit with specific maturities and values in 2015 for the first time since 
2008. This aims to attract part of the liquidity of banks through auctions within the range of pricing determined by 
the CBJ in accordance with the terms of this tool. 
 
15.2. Traditional Monetary Policy Instruments 
Regarding the traditional monetary policy instruments, the CBJ have manipulated these instruments several 
times in the past few years in the light of the conditions, developments, and challenges the Jordanian economy faces 
as reflected on the trends in major macroeconomic variables like the stock of foreign reserves, current account 
deficit and inflation rates. Other drivers for the policy instruments changes included enhancing a growth-
enhancing environment and availing of credit at reasonable costs for financing various economic activities. Table 1 
summarizes the main developments in rediscount rate and interest rates on overnight repurchase agreements and 
overnight deposit window, besides overnight interbank lending interest rate5 and required reserve ratio on bank 
deposits. 
 
Table-1. Monetary Policy Instruments Rates (2005-2015) (%) 
Year 
Rediscount 
Rate 
Overnight 
Repurchase 
Agreements Rate 
Overnight Deposit 
Window Rate 
Weighted Average 
of Interbank 
Overnight Lending 
Rate 
Required Reserve 
Ratio on Bank 
Deposits 
2005 6.50 7.50 4.50 4.63 8.00 
2006 7.50 8.50 5.25 6.50 8.00 
2007 7.00 6.75 4.75 5.15 8.00 
2008 6.25 6.00 4.00 4.65 9.00 
2009 4.75 4.50 2.50 2.65 7.00 
2010 4.25 4.00 2.00 2.15 7.00 
2011 4.50 4.25 2.25 2.92 7.00 
2012 5.00 4.75 4.00 4.31 7.00 
2013 4.50 4.25 3.50 3.79 7.00 
2014 4.25 4.00 2.75 2.94 7.00 
2015 3.75 3.50 1.50 1.96 7.00 
    Source: CBJ. 
 
15.3. Macro-prudential Policy at the Central Bank of Jordan 
The 2008 global financial crisis highlighted the importance of maintaining financial stability. The discussion of 
monetary and fiscal policies is no longer separated from policies related to policies targeting to control systemic 
risk. Therefore, there is a vital need to focus on developing instruments for managing macro-prudential policy at 
central banks that consider the objective of maintaining financial stability on the macro level (Arab Monetary 
Fund, 2017). 
 
16. The Ratio of Credit Granted by Banks to the Private Sector to GDP 
The ratio of credit provided by the financial institutions to the private sector to GDP is a very important ratio 
that measures the consistency of the credit granted to the private sector with the pace of economic activity. In 
other words, this ratio can be visualized as an assessment of directing funding to the productive sector rather than 
concentrated in the consumption sectors and/or real estate and assets sector. The excessive lending to the later 
sectors might lead to jumps in asset prices and creating price bubbles that adversely affect economic and financial 
stability. The importance of this ratio was highlighted after the 2008 global financial crisis. Economists in general 
and monetary authorities in specific were criticized for not linking economic indicators with financial indicators 
when building their projections about the risks of economic and financial crises in the future. The importance of 
this ratio is that it measures systemic risk from both economic and financial prospects through monitoring and 
analyzing the harmony and consistency of two important indicators: the credit granted by banks and other financial 
institutions to the private sector and the gross domestic product. The ratio is compared to its long-term trend. The 
difference between the two variables is called credit gap. Systemic risks increase as the larger the difference of the 
ratio from its long-term trend (CBJ, 2012). 
Per Basel III guidelines, the banks must maintain a countercyclical capital buffer to counteract any possible 
adverse consequences of the fluctuations in economic and financial cycles. The buffer ranges between 0 and 2.5% of 
the risk-weighted assets of common-equity capital (CET1) that is applied gradually on a span of four years, given 
that minimum stable funding is available to banks, besides some minimum liquidity levels that enhance the capacity 
of banks in meeting their obligations toward their customers. 
The result of the analysis of the credit gap in Jordan revealed that the gap was below 2.0%. It reached about 
1.1% at the end of 2015. Therefore, the countercyclical capital buffer tool of macro-prudential policy does need to 
be activated. Therefore, the growth of credit granted to the private sector by the financial institutions is consistent 
with the growth in the real economy – the GDP. 
It worth mentioning that the gap exceeded 2.0% just before the 2008 global financial crisis, it ranged between 
4.1% and 8.4% during the period (Q4:2006-Q3:2008). This means that during that period, there was a vital need for 
activating the countercyclical capital buffer tool of macro-prudential policy (assuming that it the tool was available 
during this period). This gives an important lesson that systemic risks can be clearly evaluated using the analysis of 
the credit gap. Figure 4 depicts the actual credit-to-GDP ratio, its trend and credit gap for the period (2005-2015). 
                                                             
5The overnight interbank lending interest rate is not a monetary policy instrument but included in the discussion for its importance as being targeted and 
managed indirectly by monetary policy instruments. 
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Figure-4. Credit-to-GDP Ratio, Its Trend and Credit Gap (2005-2015) (%) 
                                        Source: Authors’ calculations using the CBJ databases. 
 
17. Research Methodology and Econometric Analysis 
17.1. Data Sources and Sample 
Regarding the effect of monetary policy instruments on the credit gap for all the commercial banks working in 
Jordan during the study period (19 banks), the study relied on the quarterly data obtained from the CBJ's database 
published on its website. 
 
17.2. The Model Used for Measuring the Effect of Monetary Policy Instruments on Systemic Risk 
Accumulation in the Banking System 
Regarding the model used to estimate the effect of monetary policy instruments on the accumulation of 
systemic risk in the banking system in Jordan, it was as follows: 
                       
Where 
g: credit gap. It is the deviation of the actual ratio of credit granted by the commercial banks to the private 
sector to GDP from its long-term trend estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 
r: required reserve ratio. Which is a percentage imposed on banks’ deposits and held at the monetary authority 
– usually the central bank without getting any interest returns. The goal of this ratio is providing the minimum 
liquidity requested by any commercial bank. The high this ratio, the lower the excess liquidity available at banks (if 
any) and, hence, the lower the credit available for granting loans. In contrast, the lower the required reserve ratio, 
the higher the excess liquidity at banks and the higher the amounts available for extending credit facilities. 
w: overnight deposit window rate. Which is the rate paid on excess liquidity of banks, the commercial bank 
deposit this liquidity in the CBJ for one night. The higher the interest rate paid by the CBJ on the overnight 
deposit window, the more willing are banks to deposit their excess liquidity at the CBJ instead of offering more 
loans to their clients, conversely, the lower the rate, the less willing and more reluctant the banks to deposit their 
excess liquidity using this window at the CBJ. Consequently, the excess liquidity is offered to the bank clients, it 
worth mentioning that the overnight deposit window rate mirrors the attractiveness of the Jordanian Dinar.  
d: the discount rate. Also called rediscount rate, or bank rate, interest rate charged by the CBJ for loans of 
reserve funds to commercial banks and other financial intermediaries. The banks may approach this path in order 
to obtain more funds for granting credit facilities. The higher the rate, the more reluctant banks to ask for loans, 
the lower the liquidity. 
The nature of the relationship between these independent variables and credit gap depends on their effect on 
credit (the numerator of the credit-to-GDP ratio) and GDP (the denominator of the credit-to-GDP ratio). For 
example, if the relationship between any of the independent variables in the previous equation (required reserve 
ratio, overnight deposit window rate and discount rate) and the credit gap is negative. This is attributed to the fact 
that cutting these rates increased credit more that the GDP. Therefore, the lower these rates, the higher the 
liquidity levels at banks. Consequently, they will offer more credit and hence possibly systemic risks might build 
up. Put differently, both interest rates and economic activity affect systemic risk through their effect on asset prices 
and leverage at the bank (CBJ, 2012). 
 
17.3. Econometric Analysis before Estimation 
17.3.1. Correlations 
The strength of the relationship among study independent variables are used to examine the presence of the 
problem of  multicollinearity. This problem is considered severe in case the correlation coefficient between two 
independent variables exceeds 0.80 (Obeid and Adeinat, 2017). 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for the model's variables, which are required reserve ratio, overnight 
deposit window rate and the discount rate. As appear from the table, all correlations in the matrix are accepted and 
less than 0.7. Therefore, there is no need for testing multicollinearity using the VIF test. 
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Table-2. Model's Correlation Matrix 
D w r  
3.96.0 3.9630 1.0000 R 
3.9696 1.0000 3.9630 W 
1.0000 3.9696 3.96.0 D 
                      Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
17.4. Stationary Test 
Before analyzing the results of the econometric model, the stationarity of time series must be tested to examine 
the presence of unit root problem in any of the model variables. ADF and PP test were conducted to test for 
stationarity and degree of cointegration. As many time series are non-stationary because of the presence of unit 
root in its structure. The unit root in time series means that the mean and the variance of the variable are not time 
invariant. The assumption of stationarity in time series that includes unit root in econometric models leads 
misleading statistical results – the so-called spurious regression. The analysis and econometric inference as well 
will be misleading and defective despite the high value of the coefficient of determination (R2) and t-statistic. ADF 
and PP tests are the most commonly used tools for testing the stationarity of a time series and the determination of 
its degree of cointegration.  
Table 3 shows the results of the two tests. As appears from the table, the independent variables of the model 
were level non-stationary but attained stationarity at taking the first difference, indicating a degree of 
cointegration of I(1). Similarly, the dependent variable was level; nonstationary in the estimations that included no 
intercept and/or trend for both ADF and PP tests. 
 
Table-3. Stationarity Testing Using ADF & PP Tests for the Study Variables 
Level First-differences 
 
C C+T None C C+T None 
  ADF 
G -2.1602 -2.563 -2.0498** -5.6363*** -5.0630*** -5.7059*** 
R -2.2431 -3.0848 -0.5274 -7.9554*** -7.8556*** -8.0267*** 
W -0.4721 -3.1054 -0.6399 -4.2642*** -4.3858*** -4.2835*** 
d -0.6559 -3.1374 -0.364 -3.5679** -3.6891** -3.6025*** 
 
PP 
g -2.35 -2.6629 -2.2448** -5.6004*** -5.4984*** -5.6798*** 
r -2.13 -3.0816 -1.1373 -10.188*** -10.024*** -9.6433*** 
w -1.2639 -2.4733 -0.7148 -4.3662*** -4.5880*** -4.4055*** 
d -1.347 -3.1873 -0.428 -3.4734** -3.6947** -3.5221*** 
Significant @ 1.0%***, 5.0%** and 10.0%* 
C: Constant, T: Trend 
 
17.5. Cointegration Testing  
Following the results of the stationarity testing for the model variables that indicated a first-difference 
stationarity, the test for cointegration of the model variables must be conducted. In case the test showed the 
presence of cointegration, the long-term relationship can be predicted. The most common method used for testing 
cointegration is Johansen method. According to this test, the null hypothesis for the trace test is that the number of 
cointegration vectors is less than or equal r. The test helps determine the coefficient of the speed of adjustment. 
Johansen method includes two tests: Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue. Table 4 lists the results of tests. As appears 
from the table, Trace test shows that there exist at least three long-term relationships among the variables, 
whereas the Maximum Eigenvalue test shows that there exist at least two long-term relationships among the 
variables. Consequently, the VECM can be used. 
 
Table-4. Cointegration of Model Variables Using Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue Methods 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Null Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value Prob. 
None * 0.6660 82.3496 47.8561 0.0000 
At least 1 * 0.4555 39.5819 29.7971 0.0027 
At least 2 * 0.2703 15.8761 15.4947 0.0438 
At least 3 0.0878 3.5845 3.8415 0.0583 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Null Hypothesis Eigenvalue Max-Eigen 5% Critical Value Prob. 
    Statistic     
None * 0.6660 42.7678 27.5843 0.0003 
At least 1 * 0.4555 23.7057 21.1316 0.0212 
At least 2 0.2703 12.2917 14.2646 0.1002 
At least 3 0.0878 3.5845 3.8415 0.0583 
             Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Based on the results of stationarity and cointegration tests, the paper uses the Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) to measure the impact of monetary policy instruments on credit gap in Jordan. This test link between 
short-term and long-term changes for the variables used in the study during the adjustment process, until reaching 
the long-term balance. This model can be applied for small samples according to Greene (2007) cointegration 
relationship is required (by Johansen method) before applying this model. Error correction method requires data 
that have the same degree of integration at level and differences in the same equation, the deviations from a long-
run equilibrium are corrected gradually by the dynamics and partial adjustments in the short terms. In light of the 
results of the cointegration test, the long-term relationship can be checked using VECM. 
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Regarding the calculation of the optimal number of lags (Lag Length Selection), Table 5 shows that the 
optimal number of lags for both models and using both AIC and HQC is seven. However, when using the VECM 
model, one lag will be eliminated, maintaining six lags for the model. It is worth mentioning that the selection of 
optimal lag periods depends on the frequency of the used data. The number of lag periods is usually small for the 
annual data, and it gets bigger the more the data frequency.  
 
Table-5. Results of Optimal Lag Length Selection Using Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) 
Lag AIC HQ 
0 -26.50 -26.44 
1 -32.70 -32.39 
2 -32.10 -31.55 
3 -32.25 -31.45 
4 -32.36 -31.31 
5 -32.82 -31.54 
6 -33.25 -31.72 
7 -35.38 -33.60 
                                   Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
17.6. Stability Test 
In order to investigate the existence of any structural changes in the model variables (or, alternatively, the 
presence of structural stability), this paper examined the stability of the long-term parameters together with the 
short-term movements for the model utilizing the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum squares 
(CUSUMSQ) tests proposed by Borensztein et al. (1998). These tests show any structural change in the data, in 
addition to clarifying stability and harmony between the long term and short-term parameters (Borensztein et al., 
1998). The existence of structural stability for the estimated parameters can be verified using graphical 
representation. If the plot of both tests CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stay within the critical 5% level bounds, there is 
structural stability in the model.  
From Figure 5 and Figure 6 it can be realized that both plot of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stay within the 
critical bounds, thus we can confirm the long-term relationships among model variables at 5.0% level of 
significance, implying that there exists a harmony and stability in the model for the short-term and long-term 
results. 
 
 
Figure-5. Plot of CUSUM of the Model 
                                            Source: Authors’ calculations using the CBJ databases. 
 
 
Figure-6. Plot of CUSUMSQ of the Model 
                                                Source: Authors’ calculations using the CBJ databases. 
 
17.7. Diagnostic Testing 
Table 6 shows the results of the diagnostic testing of the study model. The tests included Heteroscedasticity (is 
present when the size of the error term differs across values of an independent variable), Autocorrelation (the error 
terms are correlated with one another) using LM test, and Normality of distribution using Jarque-Bera test. The 
table shows that the probability of the three tests is well above 5.0% implying that the model does not suffer from 
any of these distortions that impact the validity of analysis. 
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Table-6. Diagnostic Testing of the VECM Model 
Chi-Square             389.5853 
Residual Heteroscedasticity Test 
Prob.                      0.2321 
LM-Stat.                13.28028 
Residual Autocorrelation LM Test 
Prob.                       0.6522 
Jarque - Bera           0.27297 
Residual Normality Test 
Prob.                       0.8724 
                                   Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
18. Estimating the Econometric Model 
The results of the standard model estimation (Table 7) show that there are two monetary policy instruments 
that have a negative effect on the credit gap in the model. They are the required reserve ratio and the overnight 
deposit window interest rate. The effect of the discount rate on the credit gap was positive. In detail, the results 
showed that there is a statistically significant negative effect of the required reserve ratio on credit gap at 1.0% 
level of significance, which clearly indicates that the reduction of the required reserve ratio by the CBJ lead to the 
injection of liquidity into banks that in turn utilize it to extend more credit to their clients leading to accumulation 
of systemic risk in case the credit did not target the productive sectors. Allocating more credit to consumption 
sectors (households) rather than to productive sectors (companies) may lead to a discrepancy between credit 
growth and GDP growth and, hence, widening the credit gap. The gap may widen further if consumption credit 
facilities lead to increase in imports, which in turn may increase the deficit in the trade balance, resulting in a 
slowdown in economic growth. 
As for the interest rate on the overnight deposit window, the negative effect of this variable on the credit gap 
was significant 1.0%. Cutting the interest rate on the overnight deposit window by the CBJ reduce the banks' 
desirability to deposit their surplus liquidity with the CBJ. Instead, they will seek other ways to utilize their 
surplus liquidity at higher returns. Therefore, banks will increase the amount of credit extended, which will lead 
consequently to the accumulation of systemic risk and, hence, increase the credit gap in the same mechanism 
indicated previously about the effect of the required reserve ratio. Finally, the effect of the discount rate on the 
credit gap was a significantly positive at 1.0%. The reduction of the discount rate by the CBJ led to an increase in 
the credit but at a rate less than the increase in GDP, which resulted in a decrease in the credit gap. Conversely, If 
the CBJ raises the discount rate, this will decrease credit at lower rates than the decrease in GDP and hence widen 
the credit gap. 
Using the results in Table 7, the VECM model can be formulated to include long-term and short-term 
elasticity in addition to the error correction coefficient as follows: 
 
 ( )        [                                ] 
 
 ( )                                        
 
As shown in Table 7, the error correction coefficient is statistically significant, which implies that this term 
helps explain the changes in the credit gap. It indicates that about 45.0% of the deviations of the credit gap from its 
long-term trend are corrected during a period not greater than three quarters. 
 
                                                Table-7. VECM Model Estimation 
Long-Term 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistics 
d(-1) -2.6575 0.8216 -3.2345 
w(-1) 4.2426 0.5722 7.4147 
r(-1) 5.6175 1.2327 4.5570 
Short-Term 
CoinEq1 0.4514 0.1967 2.2947 
D(g(-1)) 0.6640 0.4475 1.4837 
D(g(-2)) 0.8133 0.4453 1.8266 
D(g(-3)) 0.1300 0.2939 0.4424 
D(g(-4)) -0.0315 0.3524 -0.0895 
D(g(-5)) -0.1324 0.2401 -0.5514 
D(g(-6)) -0.3096 0.2648 -1.1694 
D(d(-1)) 1.3539 2.7609 0.4904 
D(d(-2)) 2.0489 2.2091 0.9275 
D(d(-3)) 2.8283 2.5793 1.0965 
D(d(-4)) 0.5564 2.0371 0.2731 
D(d(-5)) 0.2538 1.9016 0.1335 
D(d(-6)) -0.1465 1.7128 -0.0855 
D(w(-1)) -1.3687 1.5749 -0.8691 
D(w(-2)) -1.6557 1.3864 -1.1942 
D(w(-3)) -1.1623 1.6544 -0.7026 
D(w(-4)) -1.7004 1.7874 -0.9514 
D(w(-5)) 1.2195 1.6365 0.7452 
D(w(-6)) -1.0555 1.8318 -0.5762 
D(r(-1)) 0.7585 1.3887 0.5462 
D(r(-2)) 0.3579 1.0341 0.3462 
D(r(-3)) 0.0291 0.9272 0.0314 
D(r(-4)) 2.1994 0.8368 2.6282 
D(r(-5)) 0.2762 0.9147 0.3019 
D(r(-6)) 0.2122 1.0380 0.2044 
C -0.0068 0.0039 -1.7137 
                       R2=0.77, Adjusted R-Squared=0.26,  F-Stat.= 1.500570 
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The estimation results of the model revealed that there exists an inverse short-term and long-term relationship 
required reserve ratio and credit gap. The elasticity of the long-term relationship roughed 2.53, meaning that a 
10.0% decline in the required reserve ratio, for example, leads to an increase in the credit gap by 25.3%, ceteris 
paribus. For the overnight deposit window, the results showed a negative effect on the credit gap, both in long and 
short terms. The elasticity of the long-term relationship roughed 1.91, meaning that a 10.0% decline in the 
overnight deposit window rate leads to an increase in the credit gap by 19.1%, ceteris paribus. Finally, regarding the 
discount rate, the results showed a positive effect of the rate on the credit gap, both in long and short terms. The 
elasticity of the long-term relationship roughed 1.20, meaning that a 10.0% decline in the overnight deposit 
window rate leads to an increase in the credit gap by 12.0%, ceteris paribus. 
 
19. Conclusions and Recommendations 
19.1. Conclusions 
This study investigated the interaction between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy using the Vector 
Error Correction Model to test the existence of an impact (short-term or long-term) of monetary policy 
instruments in general, and the overnight deposit window in particular, on the accumulation of systemic risk in the 
banking sector. The systemic risk was measured by credit gap as detailed in the main text. The results showed that 
there exists a statistically significant negative effect of both the required reserve ratio and overnight deposit 
window and a statistically significant positive effect of discount rate on the dependent variable credit gap.  
 
19.2. Recommendations 
1- The Central Bank of Jordan should manipulate the monetary policy instruments prudently so that it takes 
into consideration their direct and indirect effect on the net interest margin and credit. 
2- The CBJ should coordinate monetary policy and macro-prudential policy in order to clearly characterize 
the systemic risks and assess their impact on both economic and financial systemic. In particular, the 
impact of any monetary policy instrument must be clearly projected before manipulating that instrument. 
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